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REMARKS OF MICHELLE ADAMSt
I would like to thank the organizers of this conference for
inviting me to speak. I think it is incredibly important and
timely to be speaking about Brown v. Board of Education1 and
about where we are and where we are going. While the question
of achieving diversity in the classroom in light of Brown's
Fiftieth Anniversary is a broad topic, I would like to touch on
what I think Brown said about diversity, and then, to link that
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and
its understanding of diversity. Ultimately, I want to suggest
that there is a direct link between the two cases and that Grutter
can be seen, arguably, as this generation's Brown, because it
provides official recognition of the Court's shift in emphasis from
desegregation in kindergarten through twelfth grade to the
possibilities for racial diversity and integration in higher
education.
Brown held that segregation of minority children in public
schools, even under conditions equal to those in schools attended
by white children, deprives them of equal educational
opportunities. The challenge of Brown was to create a solution
to the incredibly divisive issue of state-mandated segregation in
public schools. The Supreme Court responded to that challenge
by elevating racial integration to a constitutional ideal.
In its most basic form, Brown can be seen as providing
minority group members with access to white-dominated
institutions such as Southern public schools. According to this
view, Brown's desegregation mandate arose from the
understanding that the only way to undo segregation's myriad of
harms was to disestablish the architecture of subordination that
had defined that system. Equalizing facilities at black schools
would not satisfy the demands of equal protection for an
important reason: Even if the facilities at the black public
t Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.A., Brown University; J.D., City
University of New York; LL.M, Harvard Law School.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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schools were equal to those of the white schools, black children
would still be kept at a significant and continuing disadvantage
because of their lack of access to the power structure.
This vision of integration was necessitated by the idea of
injecting African-Americans into the structures of American
power and was viewed as the remedy for the continuing and
systematic lack of access that defined the system of racial
segregation in public schools. Thus, Brown stood for the
proposition that integration was the appropriate remedy for the
victims of state-mandated segregation. From this perspective,
the victims of the segregated system were the true focus. Now,
of course, as many participants in this Symposium have already
discussed, the implementation of that proposed remedy was the
truly difficult problem. In Brown, the Supreme Court declared a
general remedial mandate, but the burden of implementing it
was left to the district courts.
In Brown, the Court recognized that integration had a
significant and independent value outside of opportunities
created for minority group members. Integration benefited
society generally given the intimate relationship among
education, democracy, and citizenship. The Brown Court's
ruling hinged on the significance of education in American public
life, thus the Court's statement that education was "perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments." 3 The
Court reasoned that education was the foundation of good
citizenship, enabled the enhancement of stable values, and
provided children with a foundation for professional study in the
future, and thus, it had to be provided to all on equal terms. The
Court also emphasized the relationship between access to
education and more positive social outcomes, such as service in
the armed forces and the ability to undertake other kinds of
public responsibilities. Thus, the Court suggested, requiring
that all children receive an equal educational opportunity
transcends the specific needs of black children and benefits
society in general.
Brown contained the great promise of integration, that by
eliminating segregation, the architecture of white subordination
would crumble, thereby benefiting black Americans. At the
same time, all Americans, through enhanced intergroup and
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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interpersonal contact, would become more fully equipped to meet
the challenges of a complex and ever-changing modern society.
However, an analysis of the Brown implementation cases
reveals that the Supreme Court has never been able to deliver on
Brown's promise. Milliken v. Bradley,4 Board of Education of
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,5 Freeman v. Pitts,6 and
Missouri v. Jenkins7 all suggest that the Supreme Court has
essentially withdrawn or will withdraw from the continuing and
extraordinarily difficult problem of desegregating the public
schools on the kindergarten through twelfth grade levels. As a
result, school segregation is on the rise. Therefore, if one of the
questions of this Symposium is "Have we achieved Brown's
goals?," my response would be that we still have a very long way
to go, at least in the kindergarten through twelfth grade levels.
To the extent that Brown survives today, it does so not because
of any firm and incontrovertible mandate that secondary schools
must be desegregated, but because of the idea of racial
integration that it championed.
It is the very same idea of racial integration that Brown
championed that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in
Grutter v. Bollinger.8 Where Brown provided the bare outlines of
the importance of racial integration, Grutter is an explication of
this reasoning in twenty-first century America, shifting the idea
of racial diversity or integration to higher education. In Grutter,
the Supreme Court ruled that the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action plan, which used race as a factor in
order to have a class comprised of a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students, was consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More
specifically, the Court ruled that this desire to achieve student
body diversity, as opposed to simple racial balance, was
important enough to constitute a compelling interest in order
that the admissions plan survive strict scrutiny.
Consequently, the Court's holding raises the issue of "What
is so compelling about student body diversity?" The short
answer is that the Court identified this interest as compelling
4 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
5 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
6 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
7 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
8 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
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because of the importance of the promise of racial integration
that the Court had identified fifty years earlier in Brown. Again,
in Grutter, we see a fuller articulation of that vision, and I think
that in order to get more specific about that vision, it is
necessary to break it down into three component parts consisting
of three values emanating from racial diversity.
The first benefit of racial diversity that the Court discussed
related to the educational experience itself. The law school
believed that attaining a critical mass, or a meaningful number
of minority students, was necessary to impede feelings of
isolation on the part of minority students, thereby enhancing an
interchange of ideas both inside and outside of the classroom.
From this perspective, racial diversity promoted better learning
outcomes not because minority students speak with one voice or
because they hold the same views, but because "the unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society" likely affects
one's views, and the presence of a wide variety of views was
critical to the educational experience. 9
The second benefit of the Court's decision was cross-racial
understanding. The Court affirmed the idea of the contact
hypothesis, the perspective that we advance the larger societal
goal of breaking down stereotypes when we enable students to
better understand each other in the educational environment.
From this perspective, racial integration, particularly in the
classroom, contributes to a world where people can begin to see
each other as individuals and learn to appreciate those
individuals as members of unique groups that have specific
histories, cultures, and attributes.
The third benefit of racial diversity advanced by the Court
was solidly utilitarian. There is a compelling interest in
obtaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students
in law schools because our society, our military, and our economy
in the global marketplace demand students who are prepared to
work in diverse settings. Through this understanding, diversity
or racial integration was seen as a vehicle designed to promote
societal goals consistent with the vision of diversity coming out
of Brown v. Board of Education. At the same time, the Court
noted that educational institutions, and in particular law
schools, have to be racially diverse because they shape and
9 Id. at 2341.
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develop future leaders who would lack legitimacy in the eyes of
the public if they didn't reflect it. I believe Grutter v. Bollinger is
a stunning reaffirmation of the importance of racial diversity in
the classroom, very much linked to the core of Brown, which
envisioned a world that could be enhanced by full participation
of all of its members.
In affirming the law school's desire to achieve student body
diversity so that it could provide a superior academic experience
for all students, and against the background belief that racial
diversity enhances economic competitiveness and military
readiness, I think that Grutter affirmed the importance of
integration in our society, first articulated in Brown. However, I
think it is important to remember exactly how the Court did
that. I believe it did so from the perspective that integration and
racial diversity enhance the lives of Americans in general, not
because they enhance the lives of minority group members. As a
result, the Court upheld Michigan's desire to obtain a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students not because of the
presence of the continuing effects of past discriminatory conduct
and the resulting inequalities, but because participation by
racial and ethnic minorities in the civic life of our Nation is
essential if the dream of one nation indivisible is to be realized.
Accordingly, I think that Grutter is a triumph of the utilitarian
notion of racial integration.
Grutter suggests reason for optimism about the ability to
craft an argument stating that racial diversity and integration
are absolutely imperative to society's process of becoming one
nation rather than an unstable mass of competing groups. If we
seek a leadership class with legitimacy in the eyes of our
citizenry and hope to be competitive in the twenty-first century, I
think that this is the kind of argument that will carry the day in
the implementation of the ideas set forth in the Grutter case.
From that perspective, we might then be able to critique the
difference between our embrace of diversity in the context of
higher education and our retreat from integration on the
kindergarten through twelfth grade levels.
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